# intergovernmental panel on climate change

# CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 Synthesis Report



SYNTHESIS REPORT OF THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE



# **CLIMATE CHANGE 2014**

## SYNTHESIS REPORT

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This report will be dedicated to the memory of Stephen H. Schneider 1945 – 2010

#### **Summary for Policymakers**

#### Introduction

This Synthesis Report is based on the reports of the three Working Groups of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), including relevant Special Reports. It provides an integrated view of climate change as the final part of the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).

This summary follows the structure of the longer report, which addresses the following topics: Observed changes and their causes; Future climate change, risks and impacts; Future pathways for adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development; Adaptation and mitigation.

In the Synthesis Report, the certainty in key assessment findings is communicated as in the Working Group Reports and Special Reports. It is based on the author teams' evaluations of underlying scientific understanding and is expressed as a qualitative level of confidence (from *very low* to *very high*) and, when possible, probabilistically with a quantified likelihood (from *exceptionally unlikely* to *virtually certain*)<sup>1</sup>. Where appropriate, findings are also formulated as statements of fact without using uncertainty qualifiers.

This report includes information relevant to Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

#### 1. Observed Changes and their Causes

Human influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems. *{1}* 

#### **1.1 Observed changes in the climate system**

Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level has risen.  $\{1.1\}$ 

Each of the last three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth's surface than any preceding decade since 1850. The period from 1983 to 2012 was *likely* the warmest 30-year period of the last 1400 years in the Northern Hemisphere, where such assessment is possible (*medium confidence*). The globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature data as calculated by a linear trend, show a warming of 0.85 [0.65 to 1.06]  $^{\circ}C^{2}$  over the period 1880 to 2012, when multiple independently produced datasets exist (Figure SPM.1a). {1.1.1, Figure 1.1}

In addition to robust multi-decadal warming, the globally averaged surface temperature exhibits substantial decadal and interannual variability (Figure SPM.1a). Due to this natural variability, trends based on short records are very sensitive to the beginning and end dates and do not in general reflect long-term climate trends. As one example, the rate of warming over the past 15 years (1998–2012; 0.05 [-0.05 to 0.15] °C per

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Each finding is grounded in an evaluation of underlying evidence and agreement. In many cases, a synthesis of evidence and agreement supports an assignment of confidence. The summary terms for evidence are: limited, medium, or robust. For agreement, they are low, medium, or high. A level of confidence is expressed using five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high, and very high, and typeset in italics, e.g., *medium confidence*. The following terms have been used to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result: virtually certain 99–100% probability, very likely 90–100%, likely 66–100%, about as likely as not 33–66%, unlikely 0–33%, very unlikely 0–10%, exceptionally unlikely 0–1%. Additional terms (extremely likely: 95–100%, more likely than not >50–100%, more unlikely than likely 0–<50% and extremely unlikely 0–5%) may also be used when appropriate. Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, e.g., *very likely* (see Guidance Note on Uncertainties, 2010, IPCC for more details).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ranges in square brackets or following " $\pm$ " are expected to have a 90% likelihood of including the value that is being estimated, unless otherwise stated.

decade), which begins with a strong El Niño, is smaller than the rate calculated since 1951 (1951–2012; 0.12 [0.08 to 0.14] °C per decade). *{1.1.1, Box 1.1}* 

Ocean warming dominates the increase in energy stored in the climate system, accounting for more than 90% of the energy accumulated between 1971 and 2010 (*high confidence*), with only about 1% stored in the atmosphere. On a global scale, the ocean warming is largest near the surface, and the upper 75 m warmed by 0.11 [0.09 to 0.13] °C per decade over the period 1971 to 2010. It is *virtually certain* that the upper ocean (0–700 m) warmed from 1971 to 2010, and it *likely* warmed between the 1870s and 1971. *{1.1.2, Figure 1.2}* 

Averaged over the mid-latitude land areas of the Northern Hemisphere, precipitation has increased since 1901 (*medium confidence* before and *high confidence* after 1951). For other latitudes, area-averaged long-term positive or negative trends have *low confidence*. Observations of changes in ocean surface salinity also provide indirect evidence for changes in the global water cycle over the ocean (*medium confidence*). It is *very likely* that regions of high salinity, where evaporation dominates, have become more saline, while regions of low salinity, where precipitation dominates, have become fresher since the 1950s. *{1.1.1, 1.1.2}* 

Since the beginning of the industrial era, oceanic uptake of  $CO_2$  has resulted in acidification of the ocean; the pH of ocean surface water has decreased by 0.1 (*high confidence*), corresponding to a 26% increase in acidity, measured as hydrogen ion concentration. *[1.1.2]* 

Over the period 1992 to 2011, the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets have been losing mass (*high confidence*), *likely* at a larger rate over 2002 to 2011. Glaciers have continued to shrink almost worldwide (*high confidence*). Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover has continued to decrease in extent (*high confidence*). There is *high confidence* that permafrost temperatures have increased in most regions since the early 1980s in response to increased surface temperature and changing snow cover. {1.1.3}

The annual mean Arctic sea-ice extent decreased over the period 1979 to 2012, with a rate that was *very likely* in the range 3.5 to 4.1% per decade. Arctic sea-ice extent has decreased in every season and in every successive decade since 1979, with the most rapid decrease in decadal mean extent in summer (*high confidence*). It is *very likely* that the annual mean Antarctic sea-ice extent increased in the range of 1.2 to 1.8% per decade between 1979 and 2012. However, there is *high confidence* that there are strong regional differences in Antarctica, with extent increasing in some regions and decreasing in others. *{1.1.3, Figure 1.1}* 

Over the period 1901 to 2010, global mean sea level rose by 0.19 [0.17 to 0.21] m (Figure SPM.1.b). The rate of sea-level rise since the mid-19th century has been larger than the mean rate during the previous two millennia (*high confidence*). {1.1.4, Figure 1.1}

#### [INSERT FIGURE SPM.1 HERE]

Figure SPM.1: The complex relationship between the observations (panels a,b,c, yellow background) and the emissions (panel d, light blue background) is addressed in Section 1.2 and topic 1. Observations and other indicators of a changing global climate system. Observations: (a) Annually and globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature anomalies relative to the average over the period 1986 to 2005. Colours indicate different data sets. (b) Annually and globally averaged sea-level change relative to the average over the period 1986 to 2005. Colours indicate different data sets. (b) Annually and globally averaged sea-level change relative to the average over the period 1986 to 2005 in the longest-running dataset. Colours indicate different data sets. All datasets are aligned to have the same value in 1993, the first year of satellite altimetry data (red). Where assessed, uncertainties are indicated by coloured shading. (c) Atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>, green), methane (CH<sub>4</sub>, orange), and nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O, red) determined from ice core data (dots) and from direct atmospheric measurements (lines). Indicators: (d) Global anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from forestry and other land use as well as from burning of fossil fuel, cement production, and flaring. Cumulative emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> from these sources and their uncertainties are shown as bars and whiskers, respectively, on the right hand side. The global effects of the accumulation of CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O emissions are shown in panel c). GHG Emission data from 1970 to 2010 are shown in Figure SPM.2. *{Figures 1.1, 1.3, 1.5}* 

#### **1.2** Causes of climate change

Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre-industrial era, driven largely by economic and population growth, and are now higher than ever. This has led to atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide that are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. Their effects, together with those of other anthropogenic drivers, have been detected

# throughout the climate system and are *extremely likely* to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. *{1.2, 1.3.1}*

Anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since the pre-industrial era have driven large increases in the atmospheric concentrations of CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O (Figure SPM.1c). Between 1750 and 2011, cumulative anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions to the atmosphere were 2040  $\pm$  310 GtCO<sub>2</sub>. About 40% of these emissions have remained in the atmosphere (880  $\pm$  35 GtCO<sub>2</sub>); the rest was removed from the atmosphere and stored on land (in plants and soils) and in the ocean. The ocean has absorbed about 30% of the emitted anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub>, causing ocean acidification. About half of the anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions between 1750 and 2011 have occurred in the last 40 years (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.1d). {*1.2.1, 1.2.2*}

Total anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have continued to increase over 1970 to 2010 with larger absolute increases between 2000 and 2010, despite a growing number of climate change mitigation policies. Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions in 2010 have reached  $49 \pm 4.5$  GtCO<sub>2</sub> eq/yr.<sup>3</sup> Emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes contributed about 78% of the total greenhouse gas emissions increase from 1970 to 2010, with a similar percentage contribution for the increase during the period 2000 to 2010 (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.2). Globally, economic and population growth continued to be the most important drivers of increases in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuel combustion. The contribution of population growth between 2000 and 2010 remained roughly identical to the previous three decades, while the contribution of economic growth has risen sharply. Increased use of coal has reversed the long-standing trend of gradual decarbonization (i.e., reducing the carbon intensity of energy) of the world's energy supply (*high confidence*). {1.2.2}

#### [INSERT FIGURE SPM.2 HERE]

**Figure SPM.2:** Total annual anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (gigatonne of CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent per year, GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq yr<sup>-1</sup>) for the period 1970 to 2010 by gases: CO<sub>2</sub> from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes; CO<sub>2</sub> from Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU); methane (CH<sub>4</sub>); nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O); fluorinated gases covered under the Kyoto Protocol (F-gases). Right hand side shows 2010 emissions, using alternatively CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent emission weightings based on Second Assessment Report (SAR) and AR5 values. Unless otherwise stated, CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent emissions in this report include the basket of Kyoto gases (CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O as well as F-gases) calculated based on 100-year Global Warming Potential (GWP<sub>100</sub>) values from the SAR (see Glossary). Using the most recent 100-year Global Warming Potential values from the AR5 (right-hand bars) would result in higher total annual greenhouse gas emissions (52 GtCO<sub>2</sub>eqyr<sup>-1</sup>) from an increased contribution of methane, but does not change the long-term trend significantly. *{Figure 1.6, Box 3.2}* 

The evidence for human influence on the climate system has grown since the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). It is *extremely likely* that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together. The best estimate of the human-induced contribution to warming is similar to the observed warming over this period (Figure SPM.3). Anthropogenic forcings have *likely* made a substantial contribution to surface temperature increases since the mid-20th century over every continental region except Antarctica<sup>4</sup>. Anthropogenic influences have *likely* affected the global water cycle since 1960 and contributed to the retreat of glaciers since the 1960s and to the increased surface melting of the Greenland ice sheet since 1993. Anthropogenic influences have *very likely* contributed to Arctic sea-ice loss since 1979 and have *very likely* made a substantial contribution to increases in global upper ocean heat content (0–700 m) and to global mean sea-level rise observed since the 1970s. *{1.3.1; Figure 1.10}* 

#### [INSERT FIGURE SPM.3 HERE]

**Figure SPM.3:** Assessed *likely* ranges (whiskers) and their mid-points (bars) for warming trends over the 1951–2010 period from well-mixed greenhouse gases, other anthropogenic forcings (including the cooling effect of aerosols and the effect of land-use change), combined anthropogenic forcings, natural forcings, and natural internal climate variability (which is the element of climate variability that arises spontaneously within the climate system even in the absence of forcings). The observed surface temperature change is shown in black, with the 5–95% uncertainty range

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Greenhouse gas emissions are quantified as  $CO_2$ -equivalent (GtCO<sub>2</sub> eq) emissions using weightings based on the 100 year Global Warming Potentials, using IPCC Second Assessment Report values unless otherwise stated. *{Box 3.2}* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> For Antarctica, large observational uncertainties result in *low confidence* that anthropogenic forcings have contributed to the observed warming averaged over available stations.

due to observational uncertainty. The attributed warming ranges (colours) are based on observations combined with climate model simulations, in order to estimate the contribution of an individual external forcing to the observed warming. The contribution from the combined anthropogenic forcings can be estimated with less uncertainty than the contributions from greenhouse gases and from other anthropogenic forcings separately. This is because these two contributions partially compensate, resulting in a combined signal that is better constrained by observations. *{Figure 1.9}* 

#### **1.3** Impacts of climate change

In recent decades, changes in climate have caused impacts on natural and human systems on all continents and across the oceans. Impacts are due to observed climate change, irrespective of its cause, indicating the sensitivity of natural and human systems to changing climate.  $\{1.3.2\}$ 

Evidence of observed climate-change impacts is strongest and most comprehensive for natural systems. In many regions, changing precipitation or melting snow and ice are altering hydrological systems, affecting water resources in terms of quantity and quality (*medium confidence*). Many terrestrial, freshwater, and marine species have shifted their geographic ranges, seasonal activities, migration patterns, abundances, and species interactions in response to ongoing climate change (*high confidence*). Some impacts on human systems have also been attributed to climate change, with a major or minor contribution of climate change distinguishable from other influences (Figure SPM.4). Assessment of many studies covering a wide range of regions and crops shows that negative impacts of climate change on crop yields have been more common than positive impacts (*high confidence*). Some impacts of ocean acidification on marine organisms have been attributed to human influence (*medium confidence*). {1.3.2}

#### [INSERT FIGURE SPM.4 HERE]

**Figure SPM.4:** Based on the available scientific literature since the AR4, there are substantially more impacts in recent decades now attributed to climate change. Attribution requires defined scientific evidence on the role of climate change. Absence from the map of additional impacts attributed to climate change does not imply that such impacts have not occurred. The publications supporting attributed impacts reflect a growing knowledge base, but publications are still limited for many regions, systems and processes, highlighting gaps in data and studies. Symbols indicate categories of attributed impacts, the relative contribution of climate change (major or minor) to the observed impact, and confidence in attribution. Each symbol refers to one or more entries in WGII Table SPM.A1, grouping related regional-scale impacts. Numbers in ovals indicate regional totals of climate change publications from 2001 to 2010, based on the Scopus bibliographic database for publications in English with individual countries mentioned in title, abstract or key words (as of July 2011). These numbers provide an overall measure of the available scientific literature on climate change across regions; they do not indicate the number of publications supporting attribution of climate change impacts in each region. The inclusion of publications for assessment of attribution followed IPCC scientific evidence criteria defined in WGII Chapter 18. Studies for polar regions and small islands are grouped with neighboring continental regions. Publications considered in the attribution analyses come from a broader range of literature assessed in the WGII AR5. See WGII Table SPM.A1 for descriptions of the attributed impacts. *{Figure 1.11}* 

#### **1.4.** Extreme events

Changes in many extreme weather and climate events have been observed since about 1950. Some of these changes have been linked to human influences, including a decrease in cold temperature extremes, an increase in warm temperature extremes, an increase in extreme high sea levels and an increase in the number of heavy precipitation events in a number of regions. *{1.4}* 

It is *very likely* that the number of cold days and nights has decreased and the number of warm days and nights has increased on the global scale. It is *likely* that the frequency of heat waves has increased in large parts of Europe, Asia and Australia. It is *very likely* that human influence has contributed to the observed global scale changes in the frequency and intensity of daily temperature extremes since the mid-20th century. It is *likely* that human influence has more than doubled the probability of occurrence of heat waves in some locations. There is *medium confidence* that the observed warming has increased heat-related human mortality and decreased cold-related human mortality in some regions. *[1.4]* 

There are *likely* more land regions where the number of heavy precipitation events has increased than where it has decreased. Recent detection of increasing trends in extreme precipitation and discharge in some

catchments imply greater risks of flooding at regional scale (*medium confidence*). It is *likely* that extreme sea levels (for example, as experienced in storm surges) have increased since 1970, being mainly a result of rising mean sea level. {1.4}

Impacts from recent climate-related extremes, such as heat waves, droughts, floods, cyclones, and wildfires, reveal significant vulnerability and exposure of some ecosystems and many human systems to current climate variability (*very high confidence*). *[1.4]* 

#### 2. Future Climate Changes, Risks and Impacts

Continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems. Limiting climate change would require substantial and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions which, together with adaptation, can limit climate change risks. *{2}* 

#### 2.1 Key drivers of future climate

Cumulative emissions of  $CO_2$  largely determine global mean surface warming by the late 21st century and beyond. Projections of greenhouse gas emissions vary over a wide range, depending on both socioeconomic development and climate policy.  $\{2,1\}$ 

Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are mainly driven by population size, economic activity, lifestyle, energy use, land-use patterns, technology and climate policy. The "Representative Concentration Pathways" (RCPs) which are used for making projections based on these factors describe four different 21st century pathways of greenhouse gas emissions and atmospheric concentrations, air pollutant emissions and land-use. The RCPs include a stringent mitigation scenario (RCP2.6), two intermediate scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP6.0), and one scenario with very high greenhouse gas emissions (RCP8.5). Scenarios without additional efforts to constrain emissions ("baseline scenarios") lead to pathways ranging between RCP6.0 and RCP8.5. RCP2.6 is representative of a scenario that aims to keep global warming *likely* below 2°C above pre-industrial temperatures (Figure SPM.5.a). The RCPs are consistent with the wide range of scenarios in the literature as assessed by WGIII<sup>5</sup>. *{2.1, Box 2.2, 4.3}* 

#### [INSERT FIGURE SPM.5 HERE]

**Figure SPM.5:** (a) Emissions of  $CO_2$  alone in the Representative Concentration Pathways (lines) and the associated scenario categories used in WGIII (coloured areas show 5-95% range). The WGIII scenario categories summarize the wide range of emission scenarios published in the scientific literature and are defined on the basis of  $CO_2$ -eq concentration levels (in ppm) in 2100. The time series of other greenhouse gas emissions are shown in Box 2.2, Figure 1. (b) Global mean surface temperature increase at the time global  $CO_2$  emissions reach a given net cumulative total, plotted as a function of that total, from various lines of evidence. Coloured plume shows the spread of past and future projections from a hierarchy of climate-carbon cycle models driven by historical emissions and the four RCPs over all times out to 2100, and fades with the decreasing number of available models. Ellipses show total anthropogenic warming in 2100 versus cumulative  $CO_2$  emissions from 1870 to 2100 from a simple climate model (median climate response) under the scenario categories used in WGIII. The width of the ellipses in terms of temperature is caused by the impact of different scenarios for non-CO<sub>2</sub> climate drivers. The filled black ellipse shows observed emissions to 2005 and observed temperatures in the decade 2000-2009 with associated uncertainties. *{Box 2.2, Figure 1, Figure 2.3}* 

Multiple lines of evidence indicate a strong, consistent, almost linear relationship between cumulative  $CO_2$  emissions and projected global temperature change to the year 2100 in both the RCPs and the wider set of mitigation scenarios analysed in WGIII (Figure SPM.5.b). Any given level of warming is associated with a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Roughly 300 baseline scenarios and 900 mitigation scenarios are categorized by  $CO_2$ -equivalent concentration ( $CO_2$ -eq) by 2100. The  $CO_2$ -eq includes the forcing due to all GHGs (including halogenated gases and tropospheric ozone), aerosols and albedo change.

range of cumulative  $CO_2$  emissions<sup>6</sup>, and therefore, e.g., higher emissions in earlier decades imply lower emissions later. *{2.2.5, Table 2.2}* 

Multi-model results show that limiting total human-induced warming to less than 2°C relative to the period 1861-1880 with a probability of  $>66\%^7$  would require cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from all anthropogenic sources since 1870 to remain below about 2900 GtCO<sub>2</sub> (with a range of 2550-3150 GtCO<sub>2</sub> depending on non-CO<sub>2</sub> drivers). About 1900 GtCO<sub>2</sub><sup>8</sup> had already been emitted by 2011. For additional context see Table 2.2. {2.2.5}

#### 2.2 **Projected changes in the climate system**

The projected changes in Section SPM 2.2 are for 2081-2100 relative to 1986-2005, unless otherwise indicated.

Surface temperature is projected to rise over the 21st century under all assessed emission scenarios. It is *very likely* that heat waves will occur more often and last longer, and that extreme precipitation events will become more intense and frequent in many regions. The ocean will continue to warm and acidify, and global mean sea level to rise. *{2.2}* 

Future climate will depend on committed warming caused by past anthropogenic emissions, as well as future anthropogenic emissions and natural climate variability. The global mean surface temperature change for the period 2016-2035 relative to 1986-2005 is similar for the four RCPs and will *likely* be in the range  $0.3^{\circ}$ C- $0.7^{\circ}$ C (*medium confidence*). This assumes that there will be no major volcanic eruptions or changes in some natural sources (e.g., CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O), or unexpected changes in total solar irradiance. By mid-21st century, the magnitude of the projected climate change is substantially affected by the choice of emissions scenario. *{2.2.1, Table 2.1}* 

Relative to 1850-1900, global surface temperature change for the end of the 21st century (2081-2100) is projected to *likely* exceed 1.5°C for RCP4.5, RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 (*high confidence*). Warming is *likely* to exceed 2°C for RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 (*high confidence*), *more likely than not* to exceed 2°C for RCP4.5 (*medium confidence*), but *unlikely* to exceed 2°C for RCP2.6 (*medium confidence*).{2.2.1}

The increase of global mean surface temperature by the end of the 21st century (2081-2100) relative to 1986-2005 is *likely* to be 0.3°C–1.7°C under RCP2.6, 1.1°C–2.6°C under RCP4.5, 1.4°C–3.1°C under RCP6.0, and 2.6°C–4.8°C under RCP8.5<sup>9</sup>. The Arctic region will continue to warm more rapidly than the global mean (Figure SPM.6.a, Figure SPM.7.a). *{2.2.1, Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2, Table 2.1}* 

It is *virtually certain* that there will be more frequent hot and fewer cold temperature extremes over most land areas on daily and seasonal timescales, as global mean surface temperature increases. It is *very likely* that heat waves will occur with a higher frequency and longer duration. Occasional cold winter extremes will continue to occur. *{2.2.1}* 

#### [INSERT FIGURE SPM.6 HERE]

**Figure SPM.6:** Global average surface temperature change (**a**) and global mean sea-level rise<sup>10</sup> (**b**) from 2006 to 2100 as determined by multi-model simulations. All changes are relative to 1986-2005. Time series of projections and a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Quantification of this range of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions requires taking into account non-CO<sub>2</sub> drivers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Corresponding figures for limiting warming to  $2^{\circ}$ C with a probability of >50% and >33% are 3000 GtCO<sub>2</sub> (range of 2900-3200 GtCO<sub>2</sub>) and 3300 GtCO<sub>2</sub> (range of 2950-3800 GtCO<sub>2</sub>) respectively. Higher or lower temperature limits would imply larger or lower cumulative emissions respectively.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> This corresponds to about two thirds of the 2900 GtCO<sub>2</sub> that would limit warming to less than 2°C with a probability of >66%; to about 63% of the total amount of 3000 GtCO<sub>2</sub> that would limit warming to less than 2°C with a probability of >50%; and to about 58% of the total amount of 3300 GtCO<sub>2</sub> that would limit warming to less than 2°C with a probability of >53%.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The period 1986-2005 is approximately 0.61 [0.55 to 0.67] °C warmer than 1850-1900. *{2.2.1}* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Based on current understanding (from observations, physical understanding and modelling), only the collapse of marine-based sectors of the Antarctic ice sheet, if initiated, could cause global mean sea level to rise substantially above

measure of uncertainty (shading) are shown for scenarios RCP2.6 (blue) and RCP8.5 (red). The mean and associated uncertainties averaged over 2081-2100 are given for all RCP scenarios as coloured vertical bars at the right hand side of each panel. The number of Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) models used to calculate the multi-model mean is indicated. *{2.2, Figure 2.1}* 

#### [INSERT FIGURE SPM.7 HERE]

**Figure SPM.7:** Change in average surface temperature (**a**) and change in average precipitation (**b**) based on multimodel mean projections for 2081–2100 relative to 1986-2005 under the RCP2.6 (left) and RCP8.5 (right) scenarios. The number of models used to calculate the multi-model mean is indicated in the upper right corner of each panel. Stippling (i.e., dots) shows regions where the projected change is large compared to natural internal variability, and where at least 90% of models agree on the sign of change. Hatching (i.e., diagonal lines) shows regions where the projected change is less than one standard deviation of the natural internal variability. *[2.2, Figure 2.2]* 

Changes in precipitation will not be uniform. The high-latitudes and the equatorial Pacific are *likely* to experience an increase in annual mean precipitation under the RCP8.5 scenario. In many mid-latitude and subtropical dry regions, mean precipitation will *likely* decrease, while in many mid-latitude wet regions, mean precipitation will *likely* increase under the RCP8.5 scenario (Figure SPM.7.b). Extreme precipitation events over most of the mid-latitude land masses and over wet tropical regions will *very likely* become more intense and more frequent. *{2.2.2, Figure 2.2}* 

The global ocean will continue to warm during the 21st century, with the strongest warming projected for the surface in tropical and Northern Hemisphere subtropical regions (Figure SPM.7.a). *{2.2.3, Figure 2.2}* 

Earth System Models project a global increase in ocean acidification for all RCP scenarios by the end of the 21st century, with a slow recovery after mid-century under RCP2.6. The decrease in surface ocean pH is in the range of 0.06 to 0.07 (15–17% increase in acidity) for RCP2.6, 0.14 to 0.15 (38–41%) for RCP4.5, 0.20 to 0.21 (58–62%) for RCP6.0, and 0.30 to 0.32 (100–109%) for RCP8.5. *{2.2.4, Figure 2.1}* 

Year-round reductions in Arctic sea ice are projected for all RCP scenarios. A nearly ice-free<sup>11</sup> Arctic Ocean in the summer sea-ice minimum in September before mid-century is *likely* for RCP8.5<sup>12</sup> (*medium confidence*). {2.2.3, Figure 2.1}

It is *virtually certain* that near-surface permafrost extent at high northern latitudes will be reduced as global mean surface temperature increases, with the area of permafrost near the surface (upper 3.5 m) projected to decrease by 37% (RCP2.6) to 81% (RCP8.5) for the multi-model average (*medium confidence*). {2.2.3}

The global glacier volume, excluding glaciers on the periphery of Antarctica (and excluding the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets), is projected to decrease by 15 to 55% for RCP2.6, and by 35 to 85% for RCP8.5 (*medium confidence*). {2.2.3}

There has been significant improvement in understanding and projection of sea-level change since the AR4. Global mean sea-level rise will continue during the 21st century, *very likely* at a faster rate than observed from 1971 to 2010. For the period 2081-2100 relative to 1986-2005, the rise will *likely* be in the ranges of 0.26 to 0.55 m for RCP2.6, and of 0.45 to 0.82 m for RCP8.5 (*medium confidence*)<sup>10</sup> (Figure SPM.6.b). Sea-level rise will not be uniform across regions. By the end of the 21st century, it is *very likely* that sea level will rise in more than about 95% of the ocean area. About 70% of the coastlines worldwide are projected to experience a sea-level change within  $\pm$  20% of the global mean. {2.2.3}

the *likely* range during the 21st century. There is *medium confidence* that this additional contribution would not exceed several tenths of a meter of sea-level rise during the 21st century.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> When sea-ice extent is less than one million km<sup>2</sup> for at least five consecutive years.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Based on an assessment of the subset of models that most closely reproduce the climatological mean state and 1979-2012 trend of the Arctic sea-ice extent.

#### 2.3 Future risks and impacts caused by a changing climate

Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development. *{2.3}* 

Risk of climate-related impacts results from the interaction of climate-related hazards (including hazardous events and trends) with the vulnerability and exposure of human and natural systems, including their ability to adapt. Rising rates and magnitudes of warming and other changes in the climate system, accompanied by ocean acidification, increase the risk of severe, pervasive, and in some cases irreversible detrimental impacts. Some risks are particularly relevant for individual regions (Figure SPM.8), while others are global. The overall risks of future climate change impacts can be reduced by limiting the rate and magnitude of climate change, including ocean acidification. The precise levels of climate change sufficient to trigger abrupt and irreversible change remain uncertain, but the risk associated with crossing such thresholds increases with rising temperature (*medium confidence*). For risk assessment, it is important to evaluate the widest possible range of impacts, including low-probability outcomes with large consequences. *{1.5, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, Box Introduction 1, Box 2.3, Box 2.4}* 

A large fraction of species face increased extinction risk due to climate change during and beyond the 21st century, especially as climate change interacts with other stressors (*high confidence*). Most plant species cannot naturally shift their geographical ranges sufficiently fast to keep up with current and high projected rates of climate change in most landscapes; most small mammals and freshwater molluscs will not be able to keep up at the rates projected under RCP4.5 and above in flat landscapes in this century (*high confidence*). Future risk is indicated to be high by the observation that natural global climate change at rates lower than current anthropogenic climate change caused significant ecosystem shifts and species extinctions during the past millions of years. Marine organisms will face progressively lower oxygen levels and high rates and magnitudes of ocean acidification (*high confidence*), with associated risks exacerbated by rising ocean temperature extremes (*medium confidence*). Coral reefs and polar ecosystems are highly vulnerable. Coastal systems and low-lying areas are at risk from sea-level rise, which will continue for centuries even if the global mean temperature is stabilised (*high confidence*). {2.3, 2.4, Figure 2.5}

#### [INSERT FIGURE SPM.8 HERE]

**Figure SPM.8:** Representative key risks<sup>13</sup> for each region, including the potential for risk reduction through adaptation and mitigation, as well as limits to adaptation. Each key risk is assessed as very low, low, medium, high, or very high. Risk levels are presented for three time frames: present, near term (here, for 2030-2040), and long term (here, for 2080-2100). In the near term, projected levels of global mean temperature increase do not diverge substantially across different emission scenarios. For the long term, risk levels are presented for two possible futures (2°C and 4°C global mean temperature increase above pre-industrial levels). For each timeframe, risk levels are indicated for a continuation of current adaptation and assuming high levels of current or future adaptation. Risk levels are not necessarily comparable, especially across regions. *[Figure 2.4]* 

Climate change is projected to undermine food security (Figure SPM.9). Due to projected climate change by the mid-21st century and beyond, global marine species redistribution and marine biodiversity reduction in sensitive regions will challenge the sustained provision of fisheries productivity and other ecosystem services (*high confidence*). For wheat, rice, and maize in tropical and temperate regions, climate change without adaptation is projected to negatively impact production for local temperature increases of  $2^{\circ}$ C or more above late-20th century levels, although individual locations may benefit (*medium confidence*). Global temperature increases of  $\sim 4^{\circ}$ C or more<sup>14</sup> above late-20th century levels, combined with increasing food demand, would pose large risks to food security globally (*high confidence*). Climate change is projected to reduce renewable surface water and groundwater resources in most dry subtropical regions (*robust evidence, high agreement*), intensifying competition for water among sectors (*limited evidence, medium agreement*). {2.3.1, 2.3.2}

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Identification of key risks was based on expert judgment using the following specific criteria: large magnitude, high probability, or irreversibility of impacts; timing of impacts; persistent vulnerability or exposure contributing to risks; or limited potential to reduce risks through adaptation or mitigation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Projected warming averaged over land is larger than global average warming for all RCP scenarios for the period 2081-2100 relative to 1986-2005. For regional projections, see Figure SPM.7. *{2.2}* 

#### [INSERT FIGURE SPM.9 HERE]

**Figure SPM.9:** (A) Projected global redistribution of maximum catch potential of ~1000 exploited marine fish and invertebrate species. Projections compare the 10-year averages 2001-2010 and 2051-2060 using ocean conditions based on a single climate model under a moderate to high warming scenario, without analysis of potential impacts of overfishing or ocean acidification. (B) Summary of projected changes in crop yields (mostly wheat, maize, rice, and soy), due to climate change over the 21st century. Data for each timeframe sum to 100%, indicating the percentage of projections showing yield increases versus decreases. The figure includes projections (based on 1090 data points) for different emission scenarios, for tropical and temperate regions, and for adaptation and no-adaptation cases combined. Changes in crop yields are relative to late-20th century levels. *{Figure 2.6.a, Figure 2.7}* 

Until mid-century, projected climate change will impact human health mainly by exacerbating health problems that already exist (*very high confidence*). Throughout the 21st century, climate change is expected to lead to increases in ill-health in many regions and especially in developing countries with low income, as compared to a baseline without climate change (*high confidence*). By 2100 for RCP8.5, the combination of high temperature and humidity in some areas for parts of the year is expected to compromise common human activities, including growing food and working outdoors (*high confidence*). [2.3.2]

In urban areas, climate change is projected to increase risks for people, assets, economies and ecosystems, including risks from heat stress, storms and extreme precipitation, inland and coastal flooding, landslides, air pollution, drought, water scarcity, sea-level rise, and storm surges (*very high confidence*). These risks are amplified for those lacking essential infrastructure and services or living in exposed areas. *{2.3.2}* 

Rural areas are expected to experience major impacts on water availability and supply, food security, infrastructure, and agricultural incomes, including shifts in the production areas of food and non-food crops around the world (*high confidence*). {2.3.2}

Aggregate economic losses accelerate with increasing temperature (*limited evidence, high agreement*) but global economic impacts from climate change are currently difficult to estimate. From a poverty perspective, climate change impacts are projected to slow down economic growth, make poverty reduction more difficult, further erode food security, and prolong existing and create new poverty traps, the latter particularly in urban areas and emerging hotspots of hunger (*medium confidence*). International dimensions such as trade and relations among states are also important for understanding the risks of climate change at regional scales. *[2.3.2]* 

Climate change is projected to increase displacement of people (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Populations that lack the resources for planned migration experience higher exposure to extreme weather events, particularly in developing countries with low income. Climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflicts by amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks (*medium confidence*). {2.3.2}

#### 2.4 Climate change beyond 2100, irreversibility and abrupt changes

Many aspects of climate change and associated impacts will continue for centuries, even if anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are stopped. The risks of abrupt or irreversible changes increase as the magnitude of the warming increases.  $\{2.4\}$ 

Warming will continue beyond 2100 under all RCP scenarios except RCP2.6. Surface temperatures will remain approximately constant at elevated levels for many centuries after a complete cessation of net anthropogenic  $CO_2$  emissions. A large fraction of anthropogenic climate change resulting from  $CO_2$  emissions is irreversible on a multi-century to millennial time scale, except in the case of a large net removal of  $CO_2$  from the atmosphere over a sustained period. *{2.4, Figure 2.8}* 

Stabilisation of global average surface temperature does not imply stabilisation for all aspects of the climate system. Shifting biomes, soil carbon, ice sheets, ocean temperatures and associated sea-level rise all have their own intrinsic long timescales which will result in changes lasting hundreds to thousands of years after global surface temperature is stabilised.  $\{2.1, 2.4\}$ 

There is *high confidence* that ocean acidification will increase for centuries if  $CO_2$  emissions continue, and will strongly affect marine ecosystems.  $\{2.4\}$ 

It is *virtually certain* that global mean sea-level rise will continue for many centuries beyond 2100, with the amount of rise dependent on future emissions. The threshold for the loss of the Greenland ice sheet over a millennium or more, and an associated sea-level rise of up to 7 m, is greater than about  $1^{\circ}C$  (*low confidence*) but less than about  $4^{\circ}C$  (*medium confidence*) of global warming with respect to pre-industrial temperatures. Abrupt and irreversible ice loss from the Antarctic ice sheet is possible, but current evidence and understanding is insufficient to make a quantitative assessment. *{2.4}* 

Magnitudes and rates of climate change associated with medium- to high-emission scenarios pose an increased risk of abrupt and irreversible regional-scale change in the composition, structure, and function of marine, terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, including wetlands (*medium confidence*). A reduction in permafrost extent is *virtually certain* with continued rise in global temperatures. *{2.4}* 

#### 3. Future Pathways for Adaptation, Mitigation and Sustainable Development

Adaptation and mitigation are complementary strategies for reducing and managing the risks of climate change. Substantial emissions reductions over the next few decades can reduce climate risks in the 21st century and beyond, increase prospects for effective adaptation, reduce the costs and challenges of mitigation in the longer term, and contribute to climate-resilient pathways for sustainable development. *{3.2, 3.3, 3.4}* 

#### **3.1** Foundations of decision-making about climate change

Effective decision making to limit climate change and its effects can be informed by a wide range of analytical approaches for evaluating expected risks and benefits, recognizing the importance of governance, ethical dimensions, equity, value judgments, economic assessments and diverse perceptions and responses to risk and uncertainty. *{3.1}* 

Sustainable development and equity provide a basis for assessing climate policies. Limiting the effects of climate change is necessary to achieve sustainable development and equity, including poverty eradication. Countries' past and future contributions to the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere are different, and countries also face varying challenges and circumstances and have different capacities to address mitigation and adaptation raise issues of equity, justice, and fairness. Many of those most vulnerable to climate change have contributed and contribute little to GHG emissions. Delaying mitigation shifts burdens from the present to the future, and insufficient adaptation responses to emerging impacts are already eroding the basis for sustainable development. Comprehensive strategies in response to climate change that are consistent with sustainable development take into account the co-benefits, adverse side-effects and risks that may arise from both adaptation and mitigation options.  $\{3.1, 3.5, Box 3.4\}$ 

The design of climate policy is influenced by how individuals and organizations perceive risks and uncertainties and take them into account. Methods of valuation from economic, social and ethical analysis are available to assist decision making. These methods can take account of a wide range of possible impacts, including low-probability outcomes with large consequences. But they cannot identify a single best balance between mitigation, adaptation and residual climate impacts.  $\{3.1\}$ 

Climate change has the characteristics of a collective action problem at the global scale, because most greenhouse gases accumulate over time and mix globally, and emissions by any agent (e.g., individual, community, company, country) affect other agents. Effective mitigation will not be achieved if individual agents advance their own interests independently. Cooperative responses, including international cooperation, are therefore required to effectively mitigate GHG emissions and address other climate change issues. The effectiveness of adaptation can be enhanced through complementary actions across levels,

including international cooperation. The evidence suggests that outcomes seen as equitable can lead to more effective cooperation.  $\{3.1\}$ 

#### **3.2** Climate change risks reduced by mitigation and adaptation

Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread, and irreversible impacts globally (*high confidence*). Mitigation involves some level of co-benefits and of risks due to adverse side-effects, but these risks do not involve the same possibility of severe, widespread, and irreversible impacts as risks from climate change, increasing the benefits from near-term mitigation efforts.  $\{3.2, 3.4\}$ 

Mitigation and adaptation are complementary approaches for reducing risks of climate change impacts over different time scales (*high confidence*). Mitigation, in the near-term and through the century, can substantially reduce climate change impacts in the latter decades of the 21st century and beyond. Benefits from adaptation can already be realized in addressing current risks, and can be realized in the future for addressing emerging risks.  $\{3.2, 4.5\}$ 

Five "Reasons For Concern" (RFCs) aggregate climate change risks and illustrate the implications of warming and of adaptation limits for people, economies, and ecosystems across sectors and regions. The Five RFCs are associated with: (1) Unique and threatened systems, (2) Extreme weather events, (3) Distribution of impacts, (4) Global aggregate impacts, and (5) Large-scale singular events. In this report, the RFCs provide information relevant to Article 2 of UNFCCC.

Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread, and irreversible impacts globally (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.10). In most scenarios without additional mitigation efforts (those with 2100 atmospheric concentrations >1000ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq), warming is *more likely than not* to exceed 4°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100. The risks associated with temperatures at or above 4°C include substantial species extinction, global and regional food insecurity, consequential constraints on common human activities, and limited potential for adaptation in some cases (*high confidence*). Some risks of climate change, such as risks to unique and threatened systems and risks associated with extreme weather events, are moderate to high at temperatures 1°C to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. *{2.3, Figure 2.5, 3.2, 3.4, Box 2.4, Table SPM.1}* 

Substantial cuts in greenhouse gas emissions over the next few decades can substantially reduce risks of climate change by limiting warming in the second half of the 21st century and beyond. Cumulative emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> largely determine global mean surface warming by the late 21st century and beyond. Limiting risks across reasons for concern would imply a limit for cumulative emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>. Such a limit would require that global net emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> eventually decrease to zero and would constrain annual emissions over the next few decades (Figure SPM.10) (*high confidence*). But some risks from climate damages are unavoidable, even with mitigation and adaptation. {2.2.5, 3.2, 3.4}

Mitigation involves some level of co-benefits and risks, but these risks do not involve the same possibility of severe, widespread, and irreversible impacts as risks from climate change. Inertia in the economic and climate system and the possibility of irreversible impacts from climate change increase the benefits from near-term mitigation efforts (*high confidence*). Delays in additional mitigation or constraints on technological options increase the longer-term mitigation costs to hold climate change risks at a given level (Table SPM.2). *{3.2, 3.4}* 

#### [INSERT FIGURE SPM.10 HERE]

**Figure SPM.10:** The relationship between risks from climate change, temperature change, cumulative  $CO_2$  emissions, and changes in annual GHG emissions by 2050. Limiting risks across Reasons For Concern (panel A) would imply a limit for cumulative emissions of  $CO_2$  (panel B), which would constrain annual GHG emissions over the next few decades (panel C). **Panel A** reproduces the five Reasons For Concern *{Box 2.4}*. **Panel B** links temperature changes to cumulative  $CO_2$  emissions (in GtCO<sub>2</sub>) from 1870. They are based on CMIP5 simulations (pink plume) and on a simple climate model (median climate response in 2100), for the baselines and five mitigation scenario categories (six ellipses).

Details are provided in Figure SPM.5. **Panel C** shows the relationship between the cumulative  $CO_2$  emissions (in GtCO<sub>2</sub>) of the scenario categories and their associated change in annual GHG emissions by 2050, expressed in percentage change (in percent GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq per year) relative to 2010. The ellipses correspond to the same scenario categories as in Panel B, and are built with a similar method (see details in Figure SPM.5).

#### **3.3** Characteristics of adaptation pathways

Adaptation can reduce the risks of climate change impacts, but there are limits to its effectiveness, especially with greater magnitudes and rates of climate change. Taking a longer-term perspective, in the context of sustainable development, increases the likelihood that more immediate adaptation actions will also enhance future options and preparedness. *{3.3}* 

Adaptation can contribute to the well-being of populations, the security of assets, and the maintenance of ecosystem goods, functions and services now and in the future. Adaptation is place- and context-specific (*high confidence*). A first step towards adaptation to future climate change is reducing vulnerability and exposure to present climate variability (*high confidence*). Integration of adaptation into planning, including policy design, and decision making can promote synergies with development and disaster risk reduction. Building adaptive capacity is crucial for effective selection and implementation of adaptation options (high agreement, robust evidence). [3.3]

Adaptation planning and implementation can be enhanced through complementary actions across levels, from individuals to governments (*high confidence*). National governments can coordinate adaptation efforts of local and subnational governments, for example by protecting vulnerable groups, by supporting economic diversification, and by providing information, policy and legal frameworks, and financial support (*robust evidence, high agreement*). Local government and the private sector are increasingly recognized as critical to progress in adaptation, given their roles in scaling up adaptation of communities, households, and civil society and in managing risk information and financing (*medium evidence, high agreement*). *{3.3}* 

Adaptation planning and implementation at all levels of governance are contingent on societal values, objectives, and risk perceptions (*high confidence*). Recognition of diverse interests, circumstances, social-cultural contexts, and expectations can benefit decision-making processes. Indigenous, local, and traditional knowledge systems and practices, including indigenous peoples' holistic view of community and environment, are a major resource for adapting to climate change, but these have not been used consistently in existing adaptation efforts. Integrating such forms of knowledge with existing practices increases the effectiveness of adaptation. *{3.3}* 

Constraints can interact to impede adaptation planning and implementation (*high confidence*). Common constraints on implementation arise from the following: limited financial and human resources; limited integration or coordination of governance; uncertainties about projected impacts; different perceptions of risks; competing values; absence of key adaptation leaders and advocates; and limited tools to monitor adaptation effectiveness. Another constraint includes insufficient research, monitoring, and observation and the finance to maintain them. [3.3]

Greater rates and magnitude of climate change increase the likelihood of exceeding adaptation limits (*high confidence*). Limits to adaptation emerge from the interaction among climate change and biophysical and/or socioeconomic constraints. Further, poor planning or implementation, overemphasizing short-term outcomes, or failing to sufficiently anticipate consequences, can result in maladaptation, increasing the vulnerability or exposure of the target group in the future or the vulnerability of other people, places, or sectors (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Underestimating the complexity of adaptation as a social process can create unrealistic expectations about achieving intended adaptation outcomes. *{3.3}* 

Significant co-benefits, synergies, and trade-offs exist between mitigation and adaptation and among different adaptation responses; interactions occur both within and across regions (*very high confidence*). Increasing efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change imply an increasing complexity of interactions, particularly at the intersections among water, energy, land use, and biodiversity, but tools to understand and manage these interactions remain limited. Examples of actions with co-benefits include (i) improved energy efficiency and cleaner energy sources, leading to reduced emissions of health-damaging climate-altering air

pollutants; (ii) reduced energy and water consumption in urban areas through greening cities and recycling water; (iii) sustainable agriculture and forestry; and (iv) protection of ecosystems for carbon storage and other ecosystem services. [3.3]

Transformations in economic, social, technological, and political decisions and actions can enhance adaptation and promote sustainable development (*high confidence*). At the national level, transformation is considered most effective when it reflects a country's own visions and approaches to achieving sustainable development in accordance with its national circumstances and priorities. Restricting adaptation responses to incremental changes to existing systems and structures, without considering transformational change, may increase costs and losses, and miss opportunities. Planning and implementation of transformational adaptation could reflect strengthened, altered or aligned paradigms and may place new and increased demands on governance structures to reconcile different goals and visions for the future and to address possible equity and ethical implications: adaptation pathways are enhanced by iterative learning, deliberative processes, and innovation.  $\{3.3\}$ 

#### **3.4** Characteristics of mitigation pathways

There are multiple mitigation pathways that are *likely* to limit warming to below 2°C relative to preindustrial levels. These pathways would require substantial emissions reductions over the next few decades and near zero emissions of  $CO_2$  and other long-lived GHGs by the end of the century. Implementing such reductions poses substantial technological, economic, social, and institutional challenges, which increase with delays in additional mitigation and if key technologies are not available. Limiting warming to lower or higher levels involves similar challenges, but on different timescales.  $\{3.4\}$ 

Without additional efforts to reduce GHG emissions beyond those in place today, global emissions growth is expected to persist, driven by growth in global population and economic activities. Global mean surface temperature increases in 2100 in baseline scenarios – those without additional mitigation – range from 3.7 to 4.8°C above the average for 1850-1900 for a median climate response. They range from 2.5°C to 7.8°C when including climate uncertainty (5th to 95th percentile range). (*high confidence*) {3.4}

Emissions scenarios leading to GHG concentrations in 2100 of about 450 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>.eq or lower are *likely* to maintain warming below 2°C over the 21st century relative to pre-industrial levels.<sup>15</sup> These scenarios are characterized by 40% to 70% global anthropogenic GHG emissions reductions by 2050 compared to 2010<sup>16</sup>, and emissions levels near zero or below in 2100. Mitigation scenarios reaching concentration levels of about 500 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq by 2100 are *more likely than not* to limit temperature change to less than 2°C, unless they temporarily overshoot concentration levels of roughly 530 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq before 2100, in which case they are *about as likely as not* to achieve that goal. In these 500 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq scenarios, global 2050 emissions levels are 25-55% lower than in 2010. Scenarios with higher emissions in 2050 are characterized by a greater reliance on Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) technologies beyond mid-century (and vice versa). Trajectories that are *likely* to limit warming to 3°C relative to pre-industrial levels reduce emissions less rapidly than not to limit warming to 1.5°C by 2100; these scenarios are characterized by concentrations below 430 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq by 2100 and 2050 emission reduction between 70% and 95% below 2010. For a comprehensive overview of the characteristics of emissions scenarios, their GHG concentrations and their likelihood to keep warming to below a range of temperature levels, see Table SPM.1.*[Figure SPM.11, 3.4, Table SPM.1]*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> For comparison, the CO<sub>2</sub>-eq concentration in 2011 is estimated to be 430 ppm (uncertainty range 340 ppm – 520 ppm).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> This range differs from the range provided for a similar concentration category in AR4 (50% - 85% lower than 2000 for CO<sub>2</sub> only). Reasons for this difference include that this report has assessed a substantially larger number of scenarios than in AR4 and looks at all GHGs. In addition, a large proportion of the new scenarios include net negative emissions technologies (see below). Other factors include the use of 2100 concentration levels instead of stabilization levels and the shift in reference year from 2000 to 2010.

#### [INSERT FIGURE SPM.11 HERE]

**Figure SPM.11:** Global GHG emissions (GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq/yr) in baseline and mitigation scenarios for different long-term concentration levels (upper panel) and associated upscaling requirements of low-carbon energy (% of primary energy) for 2030, 2050 and 2100 compared to 2010 levels in mitigation scenarios (lower panel). *[Figure 3.2]* 

**Table SPM.1:** Key characteristics of the scenarios collected and assessed for WGIII AR5. For all parameters, the 10th to 90th percentile of the scenarios is shown.<sup>15,16</sup> *{Table 3.1}* [INSERT TABLE SPM.11 HERE]

Mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq in 2100 (consistent with a *likely* chance to keep warming below 2°C relative to pre-industrial level) typically involve temporary overshoot<sup>17</sup> of atmospheric concentrations, as do many scenarios reaching about 500 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq to about 550 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq in 2100 (Table SPM.1). Depending on the level of overshoot, overshoot scenarios typically rely on the availability and widespread deployment of bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS) and afforestation in the second half of the century. The availability and scale of these and other Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) technologies and methods are uncertain and CDR technologies are, to varying degrees, associated with challenges and risks.<sup>18</sup> CDR is also prevalent in many scenarios without overshoot to compensate for residual emissions from sectors where mitigation is more expensive (*high confidence*). {3.4, *Box 3.3*}

Reducing emissions of non-CO<sub>2</sub> agents can be an important element of mitigation strategies. All current GHG emissions and other forcing agents affect the rate and magnitude of climate change over the next few decades, although long-term warming is mainly driven by CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Emissions of non-CO<sub>2</sub> forcers are often expressed as "CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent emissions", but the choice of metric to calculate these emissions, and the implications for the emphasis and timing of abatement of the various climate forcers, depends on application, policy context, and contains value judgments.  $\{3.4, Box 3.2\}$ 

Delaying additional mitigation to 2030 will substantially increase the challenges associated with limiting warming over the 21st century to below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels. It will require substantially higher rates of emissions reductions from 2030 to 2050; a much more rapid scale-up of low-carbon energy over this period; a larger reliance on CDR in the long term; and higher transitional and long-term economic impacts. Estimated global emissions levels in 2020 based on the Cancún Pledges are not consistent with cost-effective mitigation trajectories that are at least *about as likely as not* to limit warming to below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels, but they do not preclude the option to meet this goal (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.12, Table SPM.2). *[3.4]* 

#### [INSERT FIGURE SPM.12 HERE]

Figure SPM.12: The implications of different 2030 GHG emissions levels for the rate of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions reductions and low-carbon energy upscaling in mitigation scenarios that are at least about as likely as not to keep warming throughout the 21st century below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels (2100 GHG concentrations of 430 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq - 530 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq). The scenarios are grouped according to different emissions levels by 2030 (coloured in different shades of green). The left panel shows the pathways of GHG emissions (GtCO2-eq/yr) leading to these 2030 levels. Black dot with whiskers gives historic GHG emission levels and associated uncertainties in 2010 as reported in Figure SPM.2. The black bar shows the estimated uncertainty range of GHG emissions implied by the Cancún Pledges. The middle panel denotes the average annual CO<sub>2</sub> emissions reduction rates for the period 2030-2050. It compares the median and interquartile range across scenarios from recent inter-model comparisons with explicit 2030 interim goals to the range of scenarios in the Scenario Database for WGIII AR5. Annual rates of historical emissions change (sustained over a period of 20 years and the average annual CO<sub>2</sub> emission change between 2000 and 2010) are shown as well. The arrows in the right panel show the magnitude of zero and low-carbon energy supply up-scaling from 2030 to 2050 subject to different 2030 GHG emissions levels. Zero- and low-carbon energy supply includes renewables, nuclear energy, and fossil energy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS), or bioenergy with CCS (BECCS). [Note: Only scenarios that apply the full, unconstrained mitigation technology portfolio of the underlying models (default technology assumption) are shown. Scenarios with large net negative global emissions (>20 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq/yr), scenarios with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> In concentration "overshoot" scenarios, concentrations peak during the century and then decline.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> CDR methods have biogeochemical and technological limitations to their potential on the global scale. There is insufficient knowledge to quantify how much  $CO_2$  emissions could be partially offset by CDR on a century timescale. CDR methods may carry side-effects and long-term consequences on a global scale.

exogenous carbon price assumptions, and scenarios with 2010 emissions significantly outside the historical range are excluded.] {*Figure 3.4*}

Estimates of the aggregate economic costs of mitigation vary widely depending on methodologies and assumptions, but increase with the stringency of mitigation. Scenarios in which all countries of the world begin mitigation immediately, in which there is a single global carbon price, and in which all key technologies are available, have been used as a cost-effective benchmark for estimating macro-economic mitigation costs (Figure SPM.13). Under these assumptions mitigation scenarios that are *likely* to limit warming to below 2°C through the 21st century relative to pre-industrial levels entail losses in global consumption — not including benefits of reduced climate change as well as co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation — of 1% to 4% (median: 1.7%) in 2030 and 2% to 6% (median: 3.4%) in 2050, and 3% to 11% (median: 4.8%) in 2100 relative to consumption in baseline scenarios that grows anywhere from 300% to more than 900% over the century (Figure SPM.13). These numbers correspond to an annualized reduction of consumption growth by 0.04 to 0.14 (median: 0.06) percentage points over the century relative to annualized consumption growth in the baseline that is between 1.6% and 3% per year (*high confidence*). *[3.4]* 

#### [INSERT FIGURE SPM.13 HERE]

**Figure SPM.13:** Global mitigation costs in cost-effective scenarios at different atmospheric concentrations levels in 2100. Cost-effective scenarios assume immediate mitigation in all countries and a single global carbon price, and impose no additional limitations on technology relative to the models' default technology assumptions. Consumption losses are shown relative to a baseline development without climate policy. The table at the top shows percentage points of annualized consumption growth reductions relative to consumption growth in the baseline of 1.6% to 3% per year (e.g., if the reduction is 0.06 percentage points per year due to mitigation, and baseline growth is 2.0% per year, then the growth rate with mitigation would be 1.94% per year). Cost estimates shown in this table do not consider the benefits of reduced climate change or co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation. Estimates at the high end of these cost ranges are from models that are relatively inflexible to achieve the deep emissions reductions required in the long run to meet these goals and/or include assumptions about market imperfections that would raise costs. *{Figure 3.3}* 

In the absence or under limited availability of mitigation technologies (such as bioenergy, CCS and their combination BECCS, nuclear, wind/solar), mitigation costs can increase substantially depending on the technology considered. Delaying additional mitigation increases mitigation costs in the medium- to long-term. Many models could not limit *likely* warming to below 2°C over the 21st century relative to pre-industrial levels if additional mitigation is considerably delayed. Many models could not limit *likely* warming to below 2°C if bioenergy, CCS, and their combination (BECCS) are limited *(high confidence)* (Table SPM.2).

Mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 or 500 ppm  $CO_2$  equivalent by 2100 show reduced costs for achieving air quality and energy security objectives, with significant co-benefits for human health, ecosystem impacts, and sufficiency of resources and resilience of the energy system.  $\{4.4.2.2\}$ 

Mitigation policy could devalue fossil fuel assets and reduce revenues for fossil fuel exporters, but differences between regions and fuels exist (*high confidence*). Most mitigation scenarios are associated with reduced revenues from coal and oil trade for major exporters (*high confidence*). The availability of CCS would reduce the adverse effects of mitigation on the value of fossil fuel assets (*medium confidence*). [4.4.2.2]

**Table SPM.2**: Increase in global mitigation costs due to either limited availability of specific technologies or delays in additional mitigation<sup>1</sup> relative to cost-effective scenarios.<sup>2</sup> The increase in costs is given for the median estimate and the 16th to 84th percentile range of the scenarios (in parentheses).<sup>3</sup> In addition, the sample size of each scenario set is provided in the coloured symbols. The colours of the symbols indicate the fraction of models from systematic model comparison exercises that could successfully reach the targeted concentration level. *{Table 3.2}* [INSERT TABLE SPM.2 HERE]

Solar Radiation Management (SRM) involves large-scale methods that seek to reduce the amount of absorbed solar energy in the climate system. SRM is untested and is not included in any of the mitigation scenarios. If it were deployed, SRM would entail numerous uncertainties, side-effects, risks, shortcomings and has particular governance and ethical implications. SRM would not reduce ocean acidification. If it were

terminated, there is *high confidence* that surface temperatures would rise very rapidly impacting ecosystems susceptible to rapid rates of change. {*Box 3.3*}

#### 4. Adaptation and Mitigation

Many adaptation and mitigation options can help address climate change, but no single option is sufficient by itself. Effective implementation depends on policies and cooperation at all scales, and can be enhanced through integrated responses that link adaptation and mitigation with other societal objectives. *{4}* 

#### 4.1 Common enabling factors and constraints for adaptation and mitigation responses

Adaptation and mitigation responses are underpinned by common enabling factors. These include effective institutions and governance, innovation and investments in environmentally sound technologies and infrastructure, sustainable livelihoods, and behavioral and lifestyle choices. *{4.1}* 

Inertia in many aspects of the socio-economic system constrains adaptation and mitigation options (*high agreement, medium evidence*). Innovation and investments in environmentally sound infrastructure and technologies can reduce greenhouse gas emissions and enhance resilience to climate change (*very high confidence*). [4.1]

Vulnerability to climate change, GHG emissions, and the capacity for adaptation and mitigation are strongly influenced by livelihoods, lifestyles, behavior and culture (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). Also, the social acceptability and/or effectiveness of climate policies are influenced by the extent to which they incentivise or depend on regionally appropriate changes in lifestyles or behaviours. *{4.1}* 

For many regions and sectors, enhanced capacities to mitigate and adapt are part of the foundation essential for managing climate change risks (*high confidence*). Improving institutions as well as coordination and cooperation in governance can help overcome regional constraints associated with mitigation, adaptation, and disaster risk reduction (*very high confidence*). [4.1]

#### 4.2 **Response options for adaptation**

Adaptation options exist in all sectors, but their context for implementation and potential to reduce climate-related risks differs across sectors and regions. Some adaptation responses involve significant co-benefits, synergies and trade-offs. Increasing climate change will increase challenges for many adaptation options. *{4.2}* 

Adaptation experience is accumulating across regions in the public and private sectors and within communities. There is increasing recognition of the value of social (including local and indigenous), institutional, and ecosystem-based measures and of the extent of constraints to adaptation. Adaptation is becoming embedded in some planning processes, with more limited implementation of responses (*high confidence*). {1.7, 4.2, 4.4.2.1}

The need for adaptation along with associated challenges are expected to increase with climate change (*very high confidence*). Adaptation options exist in all sectors and regions, with diverse potential and approaches depending on their context in vulnerability reduction, disaster risk management or proactive adaptation planning (Table SPM.3). Effective strategies and actions consider the potential for co-benefits and opportunities within wider strategic goals and development plans. *{4.2}* 

**Table SPM.3:** Approaches for managing the risks of climate change through adaptation. These approaches should be considered overlapping rather than discrete, and they are often pursued simultaneously. Examples are presented in no specific order and can be relevant to more than one category. *{Table 4.2}* [INSERT TABLE SPM.3 HERE]

#### 4.3 **Response options for mitigation**

Mitigation options are available in every major sector. Mitigation can be more cost-effective if using an integrated approach that combines measures to reduce energy use and the GHG intensity of end-use sectors, decarbonize energy supply, reduce net emissions and enhance carbon sinks in land-based sectors. *{4.3}* 

Well-designed systemic and cross-sectoral mitigation strategies are more cost-effective in cutting emissions than a focus on individual technologies and sectors, with efforts in one sector affecting the need for mitigation in others (*medium confidence*). Mitigation measures intersect with other societal goals creating the possibility of co-benefits or adverse side effects. These intersections, if well-managed, can strengthen the basis for undertaking climate action. {4.3}

Emissions ranges for baseline scenarios and mitigation scenarios that limit greenhouse gas concentrations to low levels (about 450 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq, *likely* to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels) are shown for different sectors and gases in Figure SPM.14. Key measures to achieve such mitigation goals include decarbonizing (i.e., reducing the carbon intensity of) electricity generation (*medium evidence, high agreement*) as well as efficiency enhancements and behavioral changes, in order to reduce energy demand compared to baseline scenarios without compromising development (*robust evidence, high agreement*). In scenarios reaching 450 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq concentrations by 2100, global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from the energy supply sector are projected to decline over the next decade and are characterized by reductions of 90% or more below 2010 levels between 2040 and 2070. In the majority of low-concentration stabilization scenarios (about 450 to about 500 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq, at least *as likely as not* to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels), the share of low-carbon electricity supply (comprising renewable energy (RE), nuclear and CCS, including BECCS) increases from the current share of approximately 30% to more than 80% by 2050, and fossil fuel power generation without CCS is phased out almost entirely by 2100.

Near-term reductions in energy demand are an important element of cost-effective mitigation strategies, provide more flexibility for reducing carbon intensity in the energy supply sector, hedge against related supply-side risks, avoid lock-in to carbon-intensive infrastructures, and are associated with important cobenefits. The most cost-effective mitigation options in forestry are afforestation, sustainable forest management and reducing deforestation, with large differences in their relative importance across regions; and in agriculture, cropland management, grazing land management, and restoration of organic soils (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {4.3, Figures 4.1, 4.2, Table 4.3}

#### [INSERT FIGURE SPM.14 HERE]

**Figure SPM.14:**  $CO_2$  emissions by sector and total non- $CO_2$  GHGs (Kyoto gases) across sectors in baseline (faded bars) and mitigation scenarios (solid color bars) that reach about 450 (430–480) ppm  $CO_2$ -eq concentrations in 2100 (*likely* to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels). Mitigation in the end-use sectors leads also to indirect emissions reductions in the upstream energy supply sector. Direct emissions of the end-use sectors thus do not include the emission reduction potential at the supply-side due to, e.g., reduced electricity demand. The numbers at the bottom of the graphs refer to the number of scenarios included in the range (upper row: baseline scenarios; lower row: mitigation scenarios), which differs across sectors and time due to different sectoral resolution and time horizon of models. Emissions ranges for mitigation scenarios include the full portfolio of mitigation options; many models cannot reach 450 ppm  $CO_2$ -eq concentration by 2100 in the absence of CCS. Negative emissions in the electricity sector are due to the application of BECCS. 'Net' AFOLU emissions consider afforestation, reforestation as well as deforestation activities. *{4.3, Figure 4.1}* 

Behaviour, lifestyle and culture have a considerable influence on energy use and associated emissions, with high mitigation potential in some sectors, in particular when complementing technological and structural change (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). Emissions can be substantially lowered through changes in consumption patterns, adoption of energy savings measures, dietary change and reduction in food wastes. *[4.1, 4.3]* 

#### 4.4 Policy approaches for adaptation and mitigation, technology and finance

Effective adaptation and mitigation responses will depend on policies and measures across multiple scales: international, regional, national and sub-national. Policies across all scales supporting technology development, diffusion and transfer, as well as finance for responses to climate change, can complement and enhance the effectiveness of policies that directly promote adaptation and mitigation.  $\{4.4\}$ 

International cooperation is critical for effective mitigation, even though mitigation can also have local cobenefits. Adaptation focuses primarily on local to national scale outcomes, but its effectiveness can be enhanced through coordination across governance scales, including international cooperation. *{3.1, 4.4.1}* 

- The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the main multilateral forum focused on addressing climate change, with nearly universal participation. Other institutions organized at different levels of governance have resulted in diversifying international climate change cooperation. *{4.4.1}*
- The Kyoto Protocol offers lessons towards achieving the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, particularly with respect to participation, implementation, flexibility mechanisms, and environmental effectiveness (*medium evidence, low agreement*). {4.4.1}
- Policy linkages among regional, national, and sub-national climate policies offer potential climate change mitigation benefits (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). Potential advantages include lower mitigation costs, decreased emission leakage, and increased market liquidity. {4.4.1}
- International cooperation for supporting adaptation planning and implementation has received less attention historically than mitigation but is increasing, and has assisted in the creation of adaptation strategies, plans, and actions at the national, sub-national, and local level (*high confidence*). [4.4.1]

There has been a considerable increase in national and sub-national plans and strategies on both adaptation and mitigation since the AR4, with an increased focus on policies designed to integrate multiple objectives, increase co-benefits and reduce adverse side-effects (*high confidence*). {4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2}

- National governments play key roles in adaptation planning and implementation (*high agreement, robust evidence*) through coordinating actions and providing frameworks and support. While local government and the private sector have different functions, which vary regionally, they are increasingly recognized as critical to progress in adaptation, given their roles in scaling up adaptation of communities, households, and civil society and in managing risk information and financing (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {4.4.2.1}
- Institutional dimensions of adaptation governance, including the integration of adaptation into planning and decision making, play a key role in promoting the transition from planning to implementation of adaptation (*high agreement, robust evidence*). Examples of institutional approaches to adaptation involving multiple actors include economic options (e.g., insurance, public-private partnerships), laws and regulations (e.g., land zoning laws), and national and government policies and programs (e.g., economic diversification). *{4.2, 4.4.2.1, Table SPM.3}*
- In principle, mechanisms that set a carbon price, including cap and trade systems and carbon taxes, can achieve mitigation in a cost-effective way, but have been implemented with diverse effects due in part to national circumstances as well as policy design. The short-run effects of cap and trade systems have been limited as a result of loose caps or caps that have not proved to be constraining *(limited evidence, medium agreement)*. In some countries, tax-based policies specifically aimed at reducing GHG emissions alongside technology and other policies have helped to weaken the link between GHG emissions and GDP (*high confidence*). In addition, in a large group of countries, fuel taxes (although not necessarily designed for the purpose of mitigation) have had effects that are akin to sectoral carbon taxes. *[4.4.2.2]*
- Regulatory approaches and information measures are widely used and are often environmentally effective (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). Examples of regulatory approaches include energy efficiency standards; examples of information programmes include labelling programs that can help consumers make better-informed decisions. {4.4.2.2}

- Sector-specific mitigation policies have been more widely used than economy-wide policies (*medium evidence, high agreement*). Sector-specific policies may be better suited to address sector-specific barriers or market failures and may be bundled in packages of complementary policies. Although theoretically more cost-effective, administrative and political barriers may make economy wide policies harder to implement. Interactions between or among mitigation policies may be synergistic or may have no additive effect on reducing emissions. [4.4.2.2]
- Economic instruments in the form of subsidies may be applied across sectors, and include a variety of policy designs, such as tax rebates or exemptions, grants, loans and credit lines. An increasing number and variety of renewable energy (RE) policies including subsidies motivated by many factors have driven escalated growth of RE technologies in recent years. At the same time, reducing subsidies for GHG-related activities in various sectors can achieve emission reductions, depending on the social and economic context (*high confidence*). {4.4.2.2}

Co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation could affect achievement of other objectives such as those related to human health, food security, biodiversity, local environmental quality, energy access, livelihoods, and equitable sustainable development. The potential for co-benefits for energy end-use measures outweighs the potential for adverse side-effects whereas the evidence suggests this may not be the case for all energy supply and AFOLU measures. Some mitigation policies raise the prices for some energy services and could hamper the ability of societies to expand access to modern energy services to underserved populations (*low confidence*). These potential adverse side-effects on energy access can be avoided with the adoption of complementary policies such as income tax rebates or other benefit transfer mechanisms (*medium confidence*). Whether or not side-effects materialize, and to what extent side-effects materialize, will be case-and site-specific, and depend on local circumstances and the scale, scope, and pace of implementation. Many co-benefits and adverse side-effects have not been well-quantified. [4.3, 4.4.2.2, Box 3.4]

Technology policy (development, diffusion and transfer) complements other mitigation policies across all scales, from international to sub-national; many adaptation efforts also critically rely on diffusion and transfer of technologies and management practices (*high confidence*). Policies exist to address market failures in R&D, but the effective use of technologies can also depend on capacities to adopt technologies appropriate to local circumstances. [4.4.3]

Substantial reductions in emissions would require large changes in investment patterns (*high confidence*). For mitigation scenarios that stabilize concentrations (without overshoot) in the range of 430-530 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq by  $2100^{19}$ , annual investments in low carbon electricity supply and energy efficiency in key sectors (transport, industry and buildings) are projected in the scenarios to rise by several hundred billion dollars per year before 2030. Within appropriate enabling environments, the private sector, along with the public sector, can play important roles in financing mitigation and adaptation (*medium evidence, high agreement*). {4.4.4}

Financial resources for adaptation have become available more slowly than for mitigation in both developed and developing countries. Limited evidence indicates that there is a gap between global adaptation needs and the funds available for adaptation (*medium confidence*). There is a need for better assessment of global adaptation costs, funding and investment. Potential synergies between international finance for disaster risk management and adaptation have not yet been fully realized (*high confidence*). {4.4.4}

#### 4.5 Trade-offs, synergies and interactions with sustainable development

Climate change is a threat to sustainable development. Nonetheless, there are many opportunities to link mitigation, adaptation and the pursuit of other societal objectives through integrated responses (*high confidence*). Successful implementation relies on relevant tools, suitable governance structures and enhanced capacity to respond (*medium confidence*). {3.5, 4.5}

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> This range comprises scenarios that reach 430-480 ppm  $CO_2$ -eq by 2100 (*likely* to limit warming to 2°C above preindustrial levels) and scenarios that reach 480-530 ppm  $CO_2$ -eq by 2100 (without overshoot: *more likely than not* to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels).

Climate change exacerbates other threats to social and natural systems, placing additional burdens particularly on the poor (*high confidence*). Aligning climate policy with sustainable development requires attention to both adaptation and mitigation (*high confidence*). Delaying global mitigation actions may reduce options for climate-resilient pathways and adaptation in the future. Opportunities to take advantage of positive synergies between adaptation and mitigation may decrease with time, particularly if limits to adaptation are exceeded. Increasing efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change imply an increasing complexity of interactions, encompassing connections among human health, water, energy, land use, and biodiversity (*medium evidence, high agreement*). [3.1, 3.5, 4.5]

Strategies and actions can be pursued now which will move towards climate-resilient pathways for sustainable development, while at the same time helping to improve livelihoods, social and economic wellbeing, and effective environmental management. In some cases, economic diversification can be an important element of such strategies. The effectiveness of integrated responses can be enhanced by relevant tools, suitable governance structures, and adequate institutional and human capacity (*medium confidence*). Integrated responses are especially relevant to energy planning and implementation; interactions among water, food, energy and biological carbon sequestration; and urban planning, which provides substantial opportunities for enhanced resilience, reduced emissions and more sustainable development (*medium confidence*). [3.5, 4.4, 4.5]

#### Table SPM.1 [TABLE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT]

CO <sub>2</sub> eq			Change in CC	$D_2$ eq emissions	Likelihood of staying below a specific temperature level				
Concentrations in $2100 (CO_2eq)^6$ Category label (conc. range)	Subcategories	Relative position of the RCPs <sup>4</sup>	2050	2100	1.5°C	2°C	3°C	4°C	
< 430	Only a limited numbe	r of individu	al model studies	have explored le	evels below 430	ppm CO2eq <sup>10</sup>			
450 (430 – 480)	Total range <sup>1,,7</sup>	RCP2.6	-72 to -41	-118 to -78	More unlikely than likely	Likely			
500 (480 – 530) 550	No overshoot of 530 ppm CO <sub>2</sub> eq		-57 to -42	-107 to -73		More likely than not			
	Overshoot of 530 ppm CO <sub>2</sub> eq		-55 to -25	-114 to -90		About as likely as not	Likely		
	No overshoot of 580 ppm CO <sub>2</sub> eq		-47 to -19	-81 to -59	Unlikely	More unlikely		Likely	
(530 – 580)	Overshoot of 580 ppm CO <sub>2</sub> eq		-16 to 7	-183 to -86		than likely <sup>9</sup>			
(580 - 650)	Total range		-38 to 24	-134 to -50					
(650 – 720)	Total range	RCP4.5	-11 to 17	-54 to -21		Unlikely	More likely than not		
$(720 - 1000)^2$	Total range	RCP6.0	18 to 54	-7 to 72	Unlikelv <sup>8</sup>		More unlikely than likely		
>1000 <sup>2</sup>	Total range	RCP8.5	52 to 95	74 to 178	Onlikely	Unlikely <sup>8</sup>	Unlikely	More unlikely than likely	

<sup>1</sup> The 'total range' for the 430 ppm to 480 ppm  $CO_2$ -eq concentrations scenarios corresponds to the range of the 10th-90th percentile of the subcategory of these scenarios shown in Table 6.3 of the Working Group III report.

<sup>2</sup> Baseline scenarios fall into the >1000 and 720 ppm – 1000 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq categories. The latter category includes also mitigation scenarios. The baseline scenarios in the latter category reach a temperature change of  $2.5-5.8^{\circ}$ C above the average for 1850-1900 in 2100. Together with the baseline scenarios in the >1000 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq category, this leads to an overall 2100 temperature range of  $2.5-7.8^{\circ}$ C (range based on median climate response:  $3.7-4.8^{\circ}$ C) for baseline scenarios both concentration categories.

<sup>3</sup> The global 2010 emissions are 31% above the 1990 emissions (consistent with the historic GHG emission estimates presented in this report). CO<sub>2</sub>.eq emissions include the basket of Kyoto gases (CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O as well as F-gases).

<sup>4</sup> The assessment here involves a large number of scenarios published in the scientific literature and is thus not limited to the RCPs. To evaluate the CO<sub>2</sub>-eq concentration and climate implications of these scenarios, the MAGICC model was used in a probabilistic mode. For a comparison between MAGICC model results and the outcomes of the models used in WGI, see Section WGI 12.4.1.2 and WGI 12.4.8 and 6.3.2.6.

 $^{5}$  The assessment in this table is based on the probabilities calculated for the full ensemble of scenarios in WGIII using MAGICC and the assessment in WGI of the uncertainty of the temperature projections not covered by climate models. The statements are therefore consistent with the statements in WGI, which are based on the CMIP5 runs of the RCPs and the assessed uncertainties. Hence, the likelihood statements reflect different lines of evidence from both WGs. This WGI method was also applied for scenarios with intermediate concentration levels where no CMIP5 runs are available. The likelihood statements are indicative only {WGIII 6.3} and follow broadly the terms used by the WGI SPM for temperature projections: *likely* 66-100%, *more likely than not* >50-100%, *about as likely as not* 33-66%, and *unlikely* 0-33%. In addition the term *more unlikely than likely* 0-<50% is used.

<sup>6</sup> The CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent *concentration* (see Glossary) is calculated on the basis of the total forcing from a simple carbon cycle/climate model, MAGICC. The CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent concentration in 2011 is estimated to be 430 ppm (uncertainty range 340 ppm – 520 ppm). This is based on the assessment of total anthropogenic radiative forcing for 2011 relative to 1750 in WGI, i. e. 2.3 W m<sup>-2</sup>, uncertainty range 1.1 to 3.3 W m<sup>-2</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> The vast majority of scenarios in this category overshoot the category boundary of 480 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq concentration.

<sup>8</sup> For scenarios in this category, no CMIP5 run or MAGICC realization stays below the respective temperature level. Still, an *'unlikely'* assignment is given to reflect uncertainties that may not be reflected by the current climate models.

 $^{9}$  Scenarios in the 580 ppm – 650 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>-eq category include both overshoot scenarios and scenarios that do not exceed the concentration level at the high end of the category (e.g. RCP4.5). The latter type of scenarios, in general, have an assessed probability of *more unlikely than likely* to stay below the 2°C temperature level, while the former are mostly assessed to have an *unlikely* probability of staying below this level.

<sup>10</sup>In these scenarios, global CO2eq emissions in 2050 are between 70–95% below 2010 emissions, and they are between 110–120% below 2010 emissions in 2100.

#### Table SPM.2 [TABLE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT]

	Mitigatio with limit	on cost incr ed availabi	eases in sc lity of tech	enarios nologies4		Mitigation cost increases due to delayed additional mitigation until 2030				
	[%increase in 2100) relat	[% increase in mitigo immediate	n mitigation costs relative to nediate mitigation]							
2100 concentration s (ppm CO2eq)	no CCS	nuclear phase out	limited solar/win d	limited bioenergy		medium term costs (2030-2050)	long term costs (2050-2100)			
450 (430- 480)	138 % (29-297%) 4	<sup>7</sup> % (4-18%) <mark>8</mark>	6 % (2-29%] <mark>8</mark>	64 % (44-78%) 8	ן	44 % 29	37 % 29			
500 (480- 530)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	ſ	(2-78%)	(10-82%)			
550 (530- 580)	<sup>39 %</sup> (18-78%)	13 % (2-23%) <b>10</b>	8 % (5-15%)	18 % (4-66%) <b>12</b>	J	15 % (3-32%)	16 % (5-24%)			
580-650	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	5	(3.52,76)	(3 2 1 70)			
Symbol legend -	fraction of mod	lels successfu	l in producin	g scenarios (nu	ımb	ers indicate the num	ber of successful			
e all models suc	cessful			: between	n 50	and 80% of models s	uccessful			
=: between 80 a	na 100% of mode	eis successful		=: less than 50% of models successful						

<sup>1</sup> Delayed mitigation scenarios are associated with GHG emission of more than 55  $GtCO_2$ -eq in 2030, and the increase in mitigation costs is measured relative to cost-effective mitigation scenarios for the same long-term concentration level.

 $^{2}$  Cost-effective scenarios assume immediate mitigation in all countries and a single global carbon price, and impose no additional limitations on technology relative to the models' default technology assumptions.

<sup>3</sup> The range is determined by the central scenarios encompassing the 16th to 84th percentile range of the scenario set. Only scenarios with a time horizon until 2100 are included. Some models that are included in the cost ranges for concentration levels above 530 ppm  $CO_2$ -eq in 2100 could not produce associated scenarios for concentration levels below 530 ppm  $CO_2$ -eq in 2100 with assumptions about limited availability of technologies and/or delayed additional mitigation.

<sup>4</sup> No CCS: CCS is not included in these scenarios. Nuclear phase out: No addition of nuclear power plants beyond those under construction, and operation of existing plants until the end of their lifetime. Limited Solar/Wind: a maximum of 20% global electricity generation from solar and wind power in any year of these scenarios. Limited Bioenergy: a maximum of 100 EJ/yr modern bioenergy supply globally (modern bioenergy used for heat, power, combinations, and industry was around 18 EJ/yr in 2008).

<sup>5</sup> Percentage increase of net present value of consumption losses in percent of baseline consumption (for scenarios from general equilibrium models) and abatement costs in percent of baseline GDP (for scenarios from partial equilibrium models) for the period 2015–2100, discounted at 5% per year.

#### Table SPM.3 [TABLE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT]

0۱ А	verlappi oproach	ng les	Category	Examples					
:tion asures			Human development	Improved access to education, nutrition, health facilities, energy, safe housing & settlement structures, & social support structures; Reduced gender inequality & marginalization in other forms.					
Reduc			Poverty alleviation	Improved access to & control of local resources; Land tenure; Disaster risk reduction; Social safety nets & social protection; Insurance schemes.					
<b>DSURE</b> R			Livelihood security	Income, asset, & livelihood diversification; Improved infrastructure; Access to technology & decision- making fora; Increased decision-making power; Changed cropping, livestock, & aquaculture practices; Reliance on social networks.					
& Expo uding mar			Disaster risk management	Early warning systems; Hazard & vulnerability mapping; Diversifying water resources; Improved drainage; Flood & cyclone shelters; Building codes & practices; Storm & wastewater management; Transport & road infrastructure improvements.					
erability ractices inclu			Ecosystem management	Maintaining wetlands & urban green spaces; Coastal afforestation; Watershed & reservoir management; Reduction of other stressors on ecosystems & of habitat fragmentation; Maintenance of genetic diversity; Manipulation of disturbance regimes; Community-based natural resource management.					
Vuln anning, & p			Spatial or land-use planning	Provisioning of adequate housing, infrastructure, & services; Managing development in flood prone & other high risk areas; Urban planning & upgrading programs; Land zoning laws; Easements; Protected areas.					
elopment, pla				<b>Engineered &amp; built-environment options</b> : Sea walls & coastal protection structures; Flood levees; Water storage; Improved drainage; Flood & cyclone shelters; Building codes & practices; Storm & wastewater management; Transport & road infrastructure improvements; Floating houses; Power plant & electricity grid adjustments.					
through deve	nts		Structural/physical	<b>Technological options:</b> New crop & animal varieties; Indigenous, traditional, & local knowledge, technologies, & methods; Efficient irrigation; Water-saving technologies; Desalinization; Conservation agriculture; Food storage & preservation facilities; Hazard & vulnerability mapping & monitoring; Early warning systems; Building insulation; Mechanical & passive cooling; Technology development, transfer, & diffusion.					
	nal adjustme			<i>Ecosystem-based options</i> : Ecological restoration; Soil conservation; Afforestation & reforestation; Mangrove conservation & replanting; Green infrastructure (e.g., shade trees, green roofs); Controlling overfishing; Fisheries co-management; Assisted species migration & dispersal; Ecological corridors; Seed banks, gene banks, & other <i>ex situ</i> conservation; Community-based natural resource management.					
	ion ormation			Services: Social safety nets & social protection; Food banks & distribution of food surplus; Municipal services including water & sanitation; Vaccination programs; Essential public health services; Enhanced emergency medical services.					
	daptati & transf			<b>Economic options:</b> Financial incentives; Insurance; Catastrophe bonds; Payments for ecosystem services; Pricing water to encourage universal provision and careful use; Microfinance; Disaster contingency funds; Cash transfers; Public-private partnerships.					
	A		Institutional	Laws & regulations: Land zoning laws; Building standards & practices; Easements; Water regulations & agreements; Laws to support disaster risk reduction; Laws to encourage insurance purchasing; Defined property rights & land tenure security; Protected areas; Fishing quotas; Patent pools & technology transfer.					
	including ir			<b>National &amp; government policies &amp; programs:</b> National & regional adaptation plans including mainstreaming; Sub-national & local adaptation plans; Economic diversification; Urban upgrading programs; Municipal water management programs; Disaster planning & preparedness; Integrated water resource management; Integrated coastal zone management; Ecosystem-based management; Community-based adaptation.					
				Educational options: Awareness raising & integrating into education; Gender equity in education; Extension services; Sharing indigenous, traditional, & local knowledge; Participatory action research & social learning; Knowledge-sharing & learning platforms.					
			Social	Informational options: Hazard & vulnerability mapping; Early warning & response systems; Systematic monitoring & remote sensing; Climate services; Use of indigenous climate observations; Participatory scenario development; Integrated assessments.					
		Ę		<b>Behavioral options</b> : Household preparation & evacuation planning; Migration; Soil & water conservation; Storm drain clearance; Livelihood diversification; Changed cropping, livestock, & aquaculture practices; Reliance on social networks.					
		natio		<i>Practical</i> : Social & technical innovations, behavioral shifts, or institutional & managerial changes that produce substantial shifts in outcomes.					
		sfor	Spheres of change	<i>Political</i> : Political, social, cultural, & ecological decisions & actions consistent with reducing vulnerability & risk & supporting adaptation, mitigation, & sustainable development.					
		Tran		Personal: Individual & collective assumptions, beliefs, values, & worldviews influencing climate-change responses.					

#### Figure SPM.1 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]



#### Figure SPM.2 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]



Total Annual Anthropogenic GHG Emissions by Gases 1970-2010

#### Figure SPM.3 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]

### Contributions to observed surface temperature change over the period 1951-2010



#### Figure SPM.4 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]

				POLAR	REGIONS (A	ctic and Ar	tarctic)						
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Confidence in	attribution		1999 - 1999 -	Observed i	mpacts attrik	uted to cli	nate change	e for					
to climate	e change =	Physical	systems	snow ice	Biological sys	tems	н	luman and	managed	systems			
		***	and/or pe	ermafrost	44 (23)	Terrestrial	ecosystems	<b>ö</b> .	, Food pro	oduction		<ul> <li>Impacts idea</li> <li>based on av</li> </ul>	ntified ailability
very low me low	ed high verj higi		Rivers, la and/or dr	kes, floods, ought	<b>(</b> )	Wildfire		<b>Å</b>	Livelihoo and/or e	ods, health conomics		of studies a a region	cross
🔤 🗌 indica	ates	با 📥	Coastal e and/or se	rosion a level effects	<b>*</b>	Marine eco	systems						
= confic	dence range								Outlined s	ymbols =	Minor con	tribution of climation	ate change

#### Figure SPM.5 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]



#### Figure SPM.6 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]



#### Figure SPM.7 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]



#### Figure SPM.8 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]



#### Figure SPM.9 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]



Percentage of yield projections  $\overset{(\text{II})}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}{\overset{(\text{II})}}}{\overset{(\text{$ Color Legend Range of yield change 80 50 to 100% 25 to 50% increase 10 to 25% 60 in yield 5 to 10% 0 to 5% 40 0 to -5% –5 to –10% decrease –10 to –25% 20 in yield -25 to -50% -50 to -100% 0 2090–2109 2010-2029 2070–2089 2030-2049 2050-2069

#### Climate change poses risks for food production

#### Figure SPM.10 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]

(A) Risks from climate change... (B) ... depend on cumulative  $CO_2$  emissions...



#### Figure SPM.11 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]





GHG Emission Pathways 2000-2100: All AR5 Scenarios

#### Figure SPM.12 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]



#### Figure SPM.13 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]

Global Mitigation Costs and Consumption Growth in Baseline Scenarios



#### Figure SPM.14 [FIGURE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT AND QUALITY CONTROL]

Direct Emissions [GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq yr<sup>-1</sup>] 1 80 GtCO<sub>2</sub> yr 50 40 30 2100 2050 20 2010 030 10 0 Scenarios Percentile — max — 75th — median — 25th Baselines -10 430-480 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq -20 \_ min Industry Electricity Net AFOLU Non-CO<sub>2</sub> Transport Buildings  $n = \frac{\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|} 93 & 93 & 78 \\ \hline 29 & 29 & 29 \\ \hline 29 & 29 & 29 \\ \hline \end{array}}$ 80 | 80 | 65 80 80 65 147 | 147 | 127 131 131 118 121 |121 | 107 36 36 36 22 22 22 22 | 22 | 22 36 36 36 32 32 32

Direct CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by major sectors, and non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, for baseline and mitigation scenarios